Philosophy and Psychology L11: Phenomenal and access consciousness, Hard and easy problem of consciousness, knowledge argument, epiphenomalism, sensory motor theory, Illusion of free will , enactivism

phenomenal consciousness = subjective character of experience 'what-it-is-likeness'

phenomenal consciousness = subjective character of experience 'what-it-is-likeness'

qualia = qualitative aspects of consciousness (warmth, pain, itch)

phenomenal consciousness

qualia = qualitative aspects of consciousness (warmth, pain, itch)

criteria:

1. (are/are not) only subjectiely accessible

2. (have/ have not) a specific experiantial character

3. (have/have not) well defined temporal boundaries (depending on length of conscious episode)

criteria qualia

subjectively accessible, experiantial character, temporal boundaries

- qualia (are/are not) analyzable in terms of any explanatory sytsem of functional states

- a shift to greater objectivity (does/doesnt) take us further away from the subjective phenomenon

hard problem of consciousness = subjective experience arises from a physical basis, but we cannot explain why and how it arises

- concerns phenomenal consciousness

Hard problem vs functionalism

-conscious experience can only be understood from (1./3.) person perspective, that is why a scientific theory from (1./3.) person perspective seems impossible

- concerns phenomenal consciousness, because it (can/cannot) be explained by functions

access consciousness = idea that the contents of your consciousness can be clearly described, because they are accessible

access consciousness criteria

1. thought is available to co-determine your actions

2. thought is available as input for your speech

3. thought is available as input for other thoughts

easy problem of consciousness = define acess conscious states by their functions and causal roles and find brain areas performing the job

Global work space theory is an example of access consciousness,

- modules broadcast information to the system, which then sends it to the global workspace, the global workspace acts as 'communal blackboard'

materialism

- (has/ has no) mental substances

- (can/ cannot) explain the mind with physical paradigms

Knowledge argument = Mary knows everything about color perception and she lives in a black-white room, once she enters the real world and experiences what-it-is-like to see the color red

responses to the knowledge argument:

1. mary (did/ did not) know all physical characteristics of color

2. mary (does/ doesnt) learn to access knowledge in a different way

3. the knowledge argument (is/ is not)  against any theory, including substance dualism

4.  mental states (are/ are not) caused by physical states, but have no causal role themselves

epiphenomalism = mental states are caused by physical states, but have no causal effect themselves

2 stances of phenomenal consciousness

- phenomenal consciousness  cannot be investigated scientifically

- sensory motor theory of phenomenal consciousness

In sensory motor theory conscious experience is 3. temporally extended activity.

1. a mental state

2.  reducible to a brain state

3. temporally extended activity

sensory motor theory = conscious experience depends on our implicit knowledge of the sensorimotor laws, that govern the relation between possible actions and incoming visual information

- what we percieve is bodily know-how (perceptual experience)

- what we do determines perceptual processes

Match! Sensorimotor theory

Perception = 1. form of action

Perceptual experience = 2. interactions with the environment

- we perform an act to explore, the act is mediated by sensorimotor contingencies

1. form of action

2. interactions with the environment

Sensorimotor qualia = the experience what it is like to see (seeing from different angles)

original qualia = what it is like to see

Denett thinks: phenomenal consciousness (is/is not) studyable, because it is the 1. person subjective perspective

Denett: science should investigate

a. conscious experiences themselves

b. beliefs about conscious experiences

c. verbal judgments in expressing those behaviors

d. utterances one sort or another

- we can only study b) because:

1. if you have a conscious experience you dont believe to have (a, not b), then it is also inaccessible to science

2. if you believe you have conscious experiences that you dont in fact have, then it is your beliefs we need to explain, not the 'non-existent experience'

Wegner 'illusion of free will' = conscious experience is an illusion

Wegner 'illusion of free will' = conscious experience is an illusion

- the experience of consciously willing an action (is/ is not) a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action

- the thoughts and intentions that precede our action (are/ are not) apparent causes of action: they are not really causally efficacious

- the real cause of actions is (conscious/unconscious)

- epiphenomalism: mental states (are/ are not) caused by physical states, but they dont cause anything themselves

automatisms = agents perfrom actions without being consciously aware

illusion of control = agents have a conscious awareness of willing and doing, but they actually fail to perform the action

spiritualist experiments = subjects are not aware of their active contribution to what they perceive as supernatural phenomenon ex: table turning

automatic writing = subjects are not aware of the intention to make writing movements

pathological cases/anarchic/alien handy syndrome= patients report that their hand is moving on their own

automatisms

- the action is somehow controlled by the agent, there (is/is no) free will

- agents experience conscious will, because the action (does/ doesnt) match witch their intention

- there (can/ cannot) be a sense of agency without any action

apparent mental causation model = the unconscious is the actual cause of the action, but the unconscious also causes the conscious thought which is misinterpreted to be the cause of the action

-will is experienced as a result of the interpretation of the apparent link between conscious thoughts that appear in association with action and the nature of the observed action

- explains illusion of free will

name 2 experiments on apparent mental causation

1. Confabulation: subjects were presented with 4 similar panties and reasoned they choose it due to their characteristcs, no one mentioned their relative position

- people dont know the real cause of their actions

2. Johanson et al 'choice blindness'.: subjects received 2 photos of women, chose one, received the other one, had to explain why they chose the 'exchanged' photo - 84% didnt realized that they received the wrong photo - when asked if they would have realized they stated they would have

confabulation = chosing between similar alternatives

choice blindness = offering explanations why we choose something although we actually did not choose it

enactivism= argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment

- people have perspective because they are self-organizing systems who produce their own identity in interaction with the environment

consciousness (is/is not) good for distinguishing between personal and subpersonal level (Bermudez)