When Chandler fears Joey has a crush on Monica, Chandler's mental state is a mental state...
[a] ... with a quale but without intentionality.
[b] ... with phenomenal experience and aboutness. [c] ... without a quale but with intentionality.
[d] ... without phenomenal experience and aboutness.
[b] ... with phenomenal experience and aboutness.
The French philosopher René Descartes ...
[a] ... like Berkeley, thinks there are two substances. [b] ... believes that an evil demon makes all knowledge impossible.
[c] ... finds in God the unshakable foundation for his knowledge of the physical world.
[d] ... decides that the spirit steers the body like a sailor his ship
[c] ... finds in God the unshakable foundation for his knowledge of the physical world.
The interaction problem ...
[a] ... is a pseudoproblem according to Descartes.
[b] ... arises when mind and body interact with each other.
[c] ... disappears in both idealism and materialism. [d] ... can only be dissolved by invoking the existence of God.
[c] ... disappears in both idealism and materialism.
What does the behaviorist dilemma mean?
[a] That you can paraphrase the sentence “I have pain” in a sentence with behavioral dispositions without loss of meaning, but still miss the experience of pain.
[b] That the thinker is not doing anything, but that he is still doing something, namely thinking.
[c] That behaviorism is wrong, but that it was accepted for a long time because there was no good alternative.
[d] That the behaviorist must state that the mind is nothing more than behavior, but also wants to acknowledge that there is a conscious mind in the black box.
[d] That the behaviorist must state that the mind is nothing more than behavior, but also wants to acknowledge that there is a conscious mind in the black box.
What is a good example of supervenience?
[a] A tree supervenes on the ground.
[b] A poem supervenes on the letters.
[c] The cars supervene on the traffic jam.
[d] The forks and knives supervene on the cutlery
[b] A poem supervenes on the letters.
What can we use as an argument for identity theory?
[a] The causal role analysis showing that brain state x realizes pain.
[b] Leibniz's law showing that mind and brain are identical.
[c] Ockham’s razor that opts for the most parsimonious explanation.
[d] Kripke's idea that the established identity between mind and brain is necessarily true.
[c] Ockham’s razor that opts for the most parsimonious explanation.
Functionalism relates to identity theory as ...
[a] ... dualism to idealism.
[b] ... parallelism to occasionalism.
[c] ... behaviorism to monism.
[d] ... connectionism to functionalism
[d] ... connectionism to functionalism
Why is a machine based on functionalism like Shakey the robot biologically unrealistic?The machine...
[a] ... only works on the basis of parallel information processing.
[b] ... cannot respond to changes in the environment. [c] ... must first have all information before it can act.
[d] ... can only process old information
[c] ... must first have all information before it can act.
What term do we associate with connectionism?
[a] Turing machine.
[b] Graceful degradation.
[c] Parity principle.
[d] Type physicalism.
[b] Graceful degradation.
A connectionist network learns by means of "back propagation." How do you best understand this process? It means that the network is solving a problem by ....
[a] ... taking sometimes small and sometimes big steps.
[b] ... taking baby steps.
[c] ... taking many steps at the same time.
[d] ... sometimes taking a step back.
[d] ... sometimes taking a step back.
Which concept is illustrated by the “brain in a vat” thought experiment?
[a] Brain-centrism.
[b] The incoherence of substance dualism.
[c] Multiple realizability.
[d] Qualitative identity
[a] Brain-centrism
When the trigger hairs of the Venus flytrap, a carnivorous plant, are touched by an insect twice within twenty seconds, the leaf closes, trapping the insect. What is this fly-catching process an example of?
[a] The extended mind.
[b] Embedded/embodied cognition.
[c] Embedded/embodied consciousness.
[d] A propositional attitude.
[b] Embedded/embodied cognition.
Flanagan claims that phenomenal consciousness is homogeneous. What does that mean? This means that…
[a] … all experience have their own typical what-it-is-likeness.
[b] … all experiences have what-it-is-likeness.
[c] … all human beings have different experiences. [d] … all humans beings have similar experiences.
[b] … all experiences have what-it-is-likeness.
Where would the dualist locate the experience of phantom pain?
[a] In the brain – the experience is identical to a certain brain state.
[b] In the brain – the experience is realized by a certain brain state.
[c] In the phantom limb.
[d] Nowhere.
[d] Nowhere.