Like if you failed
Does anyone have an idea as to when they will publish the results?
They said in the information package that for all of the period 5 exams they strive to announce the results of course period 5 no later than Wednesday, 24 June 2020. However, they did say that this is only the targeted day. We don't have any other information for now.
i. The act is not addressed to James (there is not his name written down in the directive); ii. In directives there is almost never direct concern, because they require implementation by the MS, which breaks the link of causation In James’s case. There is also not individual concern, as also all the other whiskey producers would be affected by it. iii. the act at stake is no regulatory act, as it is a legislative act (directive) and by definition. In conclusion, James cannot ask for an action for annulment. However, what James could do (e.g. after receiving a fine for not labelling its bottles) is to bring his claim before a national court, which could refer a preliminary question to the ECJ (Article 267).
Yeah, it's quite similar I believe
hey do you think we should go into only state responsability + reparations or also, explaining how Letum can bring a claim to an international court? or only the latter ? thank you
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Yeah, We could also have gone into the jurisdiction thing, such an interesting question !
But if we elaborate about how Letum can bring a claim in front of the court then, the remedies would not be available because with the information we have, Lethum cannot go in front of the court unless the other state agrees (which is unlikely to happen)
Does the declaration of honour counts in the word limit?
of course it doesn't!
hey you agree that annulment is only possible after the directive implementation? thank you
no, an applicant can bring an annulment action even for a directive that hasn't been transposed because art. 263 allows for the judicial review of any legislative act, this includes directives
How do you guys find articles when confronted with a case? Do you search in the relevant chapter of the book? Do you search directly in treaty itself? What are your methods?
I would suggest to read the full treaty, that way you usually are able to recognize a certain situation where the articles apply.
Hello, Sorry I have a last minute question, but do you guys know, what are the alternatives to annulment action of eu acts/legislations/bodies... ? Thank you, & good luck for tomorrow
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I believe you mean the case if there is an individual who does not meet the requirements to start an annulment action (judicial review) under Art 263 TFEU. In this case there is an alternative option, in which he can bring his claim before a national court, which could refer a preliminary question to the CJEU, provided by Art.267 TFEU. The problem with this is that the individual must wait until an actual issue arises, so until he gets an adiminstrative fine/criminal charge...etc, so basically he must break the law, as the CJEU does not discuss hypothetical cases. I hope this is the answer you were looking for, or at least it helps. Good luck for tomorrow!
I do, thank you ;)
Hi guys! In order to pass exam, do I have to get 5.5 in both, in an assignment and an exam? Or I should get 5.5 in total like it was in contract?
I think it is the same as contract, you still can pass without the assignment, but your chances are lower. So 5.5 in total.
why should we not talk about art 114 TFEU in this question? (Question 3, part A)
Titanium Dioxide case, the more specific legal basis prevails over the general one. However you could argue for 114 i think
Does anyone know if there's a WhatsApp group with students willing to help each other out during the exam?
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there is the big one for the whole year '22
Yes, but what about students that are not in the big ELS group? (and can't be added anymore)
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ps we do not need part 4 of this chapter🤡
does anyone know where to find the first three Q&A recordings? they are not on blackboard under tools if not, does anyone have the answers to the second self-assessment for international law??
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It's on study drive
As about Q&A sessions, you have to open the collaborate ultra, go to recordings as usual, and then on the right top there is a part that says" filter by recent recordings". You have to click on that and there will be another option saying "recordings in range". If you click on that, on the left top, you can indicate the dates in between you would like to see the videos, so just choose something which was before the start of this course.
Does anyone know if there's a WhatsApp group with students willing to help each other out during the exam?
i'm pretty sure this was that enforcement proceedings could NOT be brought against a failure to fulfill a GENERAL obligation; it must be specific. "The Court joined the Council and rejected the idea that enforcement proceedings could be brought for the failure to fulfil the general obligation to develop a Union policy. The failure to act would have to be 'sufficiently defined.'"
can a member state bring a liability action against the EU under art. 420(2)? or is that reserved for private parties like individuals and companies?
Union liability is Art. 340 TFEU & there is no limitation on applicants. Everybody can claim damages.
Can MEEQR also be monetary (fiscal) charges?
fiscal charges fall under art. 30 - so either they are custom duties or they are charges having equivalent effects. MEEQRs are usually limitations or restrictions that are not pecuniary or monetary in nature.
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Your notes are amazing! Are you planning on uploading notes from the previous chapters? Have a nice weekend
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Majas notes are better
some people are really childish
Will using the IRAC method be required for answering the questions in the exam?
i dont think it's required but i think it helps a lot to structure answers
Does anyone have the corrected self assessment exercises? I don't have wifi and i'm on cellular data so I couldn't watch the Q&A sessions or the recordings :(
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e) 1. Normally, the Hungarian prohibition at stake would constitute a ‘selling arrangement’, as (i) it describes more ‘how’ you can sell, rather than ‘what’ and (i) it is not discriminatory, as it is also imposed on Hungarian companies, and not only foreign ones. However, in the controversial case of Ker-Optika, which presents basically the same facts and issues, the Court held that Hungary’s prohibition to sell contact lenses online constituted a MEEQR (‘because it is discriminatory even if not in law, in fact’), which is prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. 2. In that case, the Court reasoned that ‘the prohibition deprives traders from other Member States of a particularly effective means of selling those products and thus significantly impedes the access of those traders to the Hungarian market. Consequently, that legislation constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods in the European Union.’ Thus, the prohibition, being an indistinctly applicable ‘measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions’ (i.e. applies on Hungarians as well as foreign) is prohibited, unless justifiable under Article 36 TFEU or Cassis de Dijon. It may easily be argued that the Government is trying to protect public health; however, the measures taken are unnecessary and go too far in relation to the goal that the Government wants to achieve (proportionality requirement is not fulfilled). Therefore, there is no justification for Hungary’s prohibition to sell contact lenses online.
Hey do you have a summary all for this course ? used your summary for other courses and it was really helpful thanks for what you are sharing.
Unfortunately, I don’t have a summary of the reading material, but I’m going to publish soon a document with all the tasks solved and corrected. And thanks, appreciate they were useful!
Hey guys, I have a question about chapter 9 EU Law What is the difference between "selling arrangements" & "product requirements"? Thank you!
I guess the difference is that a selling arrangement relates to the market, its about 'how' a product is sold; while a product requirement is more about 'what' can be sold.
Hey guys, I have a question about chapter 9 EU Law What is the difference between "selling arrangements" & "product requirements"? Thank you!
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d) 1. The beer qualifies as a good, as it is a product that can be valued in money and that can be the subject of a commercial transaction (Commission v Italy). Is the German legislation at stake a MEEQR or a selling arrangement? It is really about ‘what’ you can sell (instead of ‘how’ you can sell): you cannot sell those beverages by labelling it as beer. Therefore, the German legislation on beer is more related to the product than the selling arrangement. Thus, it is a MEEQRS: the rule could actually (or potentially) hinder intra-[Union] trade, because it was restricting the selling of the producer (who would have to re-label all the bottles). Is this German rule indistinctly or distinctly applicable? Indistincly, as it applies to all (also to German producers). 2. Being an indistinctly applicable MEEQR, Germany can justify this measure though Article 36 TFEU, but also through the ‘rule of reason’ set out in Cassis de Dijon. In the latter case, some other justifications, besides those already listed in Article 36, were set out, namely the ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer’ necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirement. Does in this case the ‘protection of public health’ play a role as a justification? No; it would be difficult to argue that cherry damage health. How about the ‘defence of the consumer’ justification? Yes; more likely to be applicable. Even having established that there is justification to the MEEQR at stake, the proportionality requirement needs to be fulfilled. It is not fulfilled; as the German Government may have found other measures to defend their consumers instead of not qualifying beer a beverage which only adds few things to the ‘original receipt’, e.g. they could just impose to the producers to write the ingredients in the label instead of promoting such a restricting law that has specific requirements for beer.
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c) 1. The Perfume qualifies as a good, as it is a product that can be valued in money and that can be the subject of a commercial transaction (Commission v Italy). Under the Dassonville criteria the court would have said this was a MEEQR. However, in Keck the Court took a turn and it defined a ‘selling arrangement’. The French law at hand is a selling arrangement because (i) this is not really about the product (but on how it are sold) and (ii) it is not discriminatory. 2. Being a ‘selling arrangement’, this prohibition would fall outside Article 34 TFEU and thus, it does not need to be justified.
The first objective of the Netherlands, namely that to ‘make statistics on the consumption of French cheese in the Netherlands’ may be an implied justification. However, in Statistical Levy, which is a similar case, the court found that the ‘consideration for the service rendered’ implied justification does not apply, as the importers did not ask for this service. Rather, this obligation to pay is a CEE (it is in fact a custom duty, but they make it seem like it is not). As such, whatever its purpose, is prohibited (Article 30 TFEU). The second objective, namely ‘to stimulate the cheese industry in the Netherlands’ may also be considered a CEE (ask yourself: do domestic producers also have to pay taxes here? NO, thus it is a CEE and not a tax), and as such also prohibited under Article 30 TFEU. Thus, due to the fact that no implicit exceptions apply here, the obligation to pay for both the objectives constitute a restriction to the free movement of goods.
c) 1. The Perfume qualifies as a good, as it is a product that can be valued in money and that can be the subject of a commercial transaction (Commission v Italy). Under the Dassonville criteria the court would have said this was a MEEQR. However, in Keck the Court took a turn and it defined a ‘selling arrangement’. The French law at hand is a selling arrangement because (i) this is not really about the product (but on how it are sold) and (ii) it is not discriminatory. 2. Being a ‘selling arrangement’, this prohibition would fall outside Article 34 TFEU and thus, it does not need to be justified.
d) 1. The beer qualifies as a good, as it is a product that can be valued in money and that can be the subject of a commercial transaction (Commission v Italy). Is the German legislation at stake a MEEQR or a selling arrangement? It is really about ‘what’ you can sell (instead of ‘how’ you can sell): you cannot sell those beverages by labelling it as beer. Therefore, the German legislation on beer is more related to the product than the selling arrangement. Thus, it is a MEEQRS: the rule could actually (or potentially) hinder intra-[Union] trade, because it was restricting the selling of the producer (who would have to re-label all the bottles). Is this German rule indistinctly or distinctly applicable? Indistincly, as it applies to all (also to German producers). 2. Being an indistinctly applicable MEEQR, Germany can justify this measure though Article 36 TFEU, but also through the ‘rule of reason’ set out in Cassis de Dijon. In the latter case, some other justifications, besides those already listed in Article 36, were set out, namely the ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer’ necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirement. Does in this case the ‘protection of public health’ play a role as a justification? No; it would be difficult to argue that cherry damage health. How about the ‘defence of the consumer’ justification? Yes; more likely to be applicable. Even having established that there is justification to the MEEQR at stake, the proportionality requirement needs to be fulfilled. It is not fulfilled; as the German Government may have found other measures to defend their consumers instead of not qualifying beer a beverage which only adds few things to the ‘original receipt’, e.g. they could just impose to the producers to write the ingredients in the label instead of promoting such a restricting law that has specific requirements for beer.
e) 1. Normally, the Hungarian prohibition at stake would constitute a ‘selling arrangement’, as (i) it describes more ‘how’ you can sell, rather than ‘what’ and (i) it is not discriminatory, as it is also imposed on Hungarian companies, and not only foreign ones. However, in the controversial case of Ker-Optika, which presents basically the same facts and issues, the Court held that Hungary’s prohibition to sell contact lenses online constituted a MEEQR (‘because it is discriminatory even if not in law, in fact’), which is prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. 2. In that case, the Court reasoned that ‘the prohibition deprives traders from other Member States of a particularly effective means of selling those products and thus significantly impedes the access of those traders to the Hungarian market. Consequently, that legislation constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods in the European Union.’ Thus, the prohibition, being an indistinctly applicable ‘measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions’ (i.e. applies on Hungarians as well as foreign) is prohibited, unless justifiable under Article 36 TFEU or Cassis de Dijon. It may easily be argued that the Government is trying to protect public health; however, the measures taken are unnecessary and go too far in relation to the goal that the Government wants to achieve (proportionality requirement is not fulfilled). Therefore, there is no justification for Hungary’s prohibition to sell contact lenses online.
The first objective of the Netherlands, namely that to ‘make statistics on the consumption of French cheese in the Netherlands’ may be an implied justification. However, in Statistical Levy, which is a similar case, the court found that the ‘consideration for the service rendered’ implied justification does not apply, as the importers did not ask for this service. Rather, this obligation to pay is a CEE (it is in fact a custom duty, but they make it seem like it is not). As such, whatever its purpose, is prohibited (Article 30 TFEU). The second objective, namely ‘to stimulate the cheese industry in the Netherlands’ may also be considered a CEE (ask yourself: do domestic producers also have to pay taxes here? NO, thus it is a CEE and not a tax), and as such also prohibited under Article 30 TFEU. Thus, due to the fact that no implicit exceptions apply here, the obligation to pay for both the objectives constitute a restriction to the free movement of goods.
i. The rule was intended to confer rights on individuals ii. Non implementation is per se a sufficient breach iii. There is a causal link between the breach and the damage Patrick has sustained TF, Patrick has right to claim for damages
If there is an open-ended provision in the Dutch Civil code (e.g. the contract may be revoked if the information exchanged by the parties were not sufficiently clear), then the national court will have to try to fit EU law (e.g. if the contract was concluded outside a shop, it can be revoked within 7 days) while applying national law. However, this may rarely be the case. If there is no such provision, the last resort is State liability.
The relation at stake (Patrick v the Electricity Company) is an horizontal one, which means that there is no direct effect in the case at hand. The limitation of the rule relating to the wide definition of state is also not applicable in this case.
James – being an individual – may bring an action for annulment before the General Court (Article 256).
The action taken by the Union may be argued to be in breach with the proportionality, as well as the subsidiarity principle. However, it may be also argued that the mere fact that the State is ‘unhappy with the outcome of the legislative process’ is not enough to challenge an act of the Union.
i. The rule was intended to confer rights on individuals ii. Non implementation is per se a sufficient breach iii. There is a causal link between the breach and the damage Patrick has sustained TF, Patrick has right to damages
If there is an open-ended provision in the Dutch Civil code (e.g. the contract may be revoked if the information exchanged by the parties were not sufficiently clear), then the national court will have to try to fit EU law (e.g. if the contract was concluded outside a shop, it can be revoked within 7 days) while applying national law. However, this may rarely be the case. If there is no such provision, the last resort is State liability.
The relation at stake (Patrick v the Electricity Company) is an horizontal one, which means that there is no direct effect in the case at hand. The limitation of the rule relating to the wide definition of state is also not applicable in this case. TF, move on to indirect effect.
i. The act is not addressed to James (there is not his name written down in the directive); ii. In directives there is almost never direct concern, because they require implementation by the MS, which breaks the link of causation In James’s case. There is also not individual concern, as also all the other whiskey producers would be affected by it. iii. the act at stake is no regulatory act, as it is a legislative act (directive) and by definition. In conclusion, James cannot ask for an action for annulment. However, what James could do (e.g. after receiving a fine for not labelling its bottles) is to bring his claim before a national court, which could refer a preliminary question to the ECJ (Article 267).
James – being an individual – may bring an action for annulment before the General Court (Article 256).
The action taken by the Union may be argued to be in breach with the proportionality, as well as the subsidiarity principle. However, it may be also argued that the mere fact that the State is ‘unhappy with the outcome of the legislative process’ is not enough to challenge an act of the Union.
Article 47 DOES NOT apply in this case. Due to the fact that, according to Article 7(1)b, the junior minister does not have full powers, Article 8 subsequently applies, stating that if the represented State does not confirm the decision taken, there is no legal effect related to the unauthorized act performed. Conclusion: Aphoria is not bound by the Treaty, since the State did not confirm the decision taken by the Junior Minister.
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Did you get any answer? cause we also didnt use it but I was wondering whether we could?:)
Hey Sara, I’m quite sure we can argue both ways. It’s more how you argue than what for :)
Hello, Does anyone still have the PDF of the EU law book? Thank you
Text me on WhatsApp so I can forward it to you. It is +382 69 50 40 20
Some cool and helpful person reported it thx :)))
CORRECTION: Options: Article 168, Article 169 (consumer protection) or Article 114 (internal market) . The latter is very broad and can be applied more often. Article 168 is not applicable to our case because it does not allow harmonization, while the action that the Commission wants to take are harmonization measure: to label all bottles of alcoholic beverages in all Europe. Therefore, we can rely on Article 114. According to the Tobacco Advertising case, based on Article 114, to trigger the Union’s harmonization competence: (i) the European law must harmonize national law, (ii) a simple disparity in national law is not enough, the disparity must give rise to obstacles in trade or appreciable distortion in competition; and (iii) the Union legislation must actually contribute to the elimination of obstacles to free movement or distortions of competition. Is 114 then applicable to our case? Requirement (ii) makes controversies arise: it may be either argued that there is a mere disparity between the MS, which is as such not enough to trigger the harmonization competence, or contrarily that the disparity creates obstacles, which will allow the harmonization competence to apply. For the purpose of the course and the case, let's assume that Art. 114 applies, so that we can then move on to the next steps.
how would you argue though that the eu act is related to the functioning of the internal market? or, as you said, that it poses an obstacle to the free trade or competition? because i think art. 169 would be more applicable in this case than art. 114
Well, if you label all bottles from alcoholic beverages produced in all Member States, you do influence their internal markets. Remember that Article 114 really has a wide application: its potentially unlimited scope is illustrated by Spain v Council 1995. Therefore, it is applicable in most of the circumstances. However, it is also true that the limits of this article have been later on confirmed in the Tobacco Advertising case, which was the first instance in which Article 114 found no applicability. That was because European law banned the advertising and sponsorship of all tobacco products, and the harmonization power was in this instance used merely to put all the MS on the 'same level' without actually promoting the internal market of the Member States nor their interests. I would say this is not the case in Task 15, as the simple act of labeling bottles may actually prevent irreparable damage to health of people who abuse of the substances.
The directives are seen as less intrusive and thus easier to apply using the proportionality principle. This is because the regulations do not even need to be implemented, as the EU just makes the rule and the MS have to rely on it. 
In our case, we can better choose the directive as a legal instrument.
Application to the case: The directives are seen as less intrusive and thus easier to apply using the proportionality principle. This is because the regulations do not even need to be implemented, as the EU just makes the rule and the MS have to rely on it. 
In our case, we can better choose the directive as a legal instrument.
due to the modification of the applicable article from 168 to 114, this is wrong. However, it is still the OLP that applies.
due to the modification of the applicable article from 168 to 114, this is wrong. However, it is still the OLP that applies.
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