Managerial Economics

at Maastricht University

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Does anyone know if the exam only option is available for ME if you failed both sits?
Can't seem to find the answers of sample exam 5? Can you please share the answers if you have them :)
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and isnt q7 both seperating?
did anyone find sample exam 5?
Can someone please share the answer to question 5 of sample exam 5 with calculations? would be really helpfull!!!
Anyone has answers for sample exam 3? I can't find it.
Can someone explain this ?
How an auction can reduce asymmetric information in a lemon market ?
People who value it with full information will not bid above a given value and thus the auction will be won by the people who can bid in their max value given their information another way is that if the auction is a second price auction even if you lets say bid 1000 without info people with info will bid the true value lets say 600 thus you pay 600
thanks mate
i dont really understand how i can see if a BNE is pooling or seperating could anyone expalin it :)
This should be non-rival instead of non-trivial. Sorry for the mistake
Can people stop spamming the same shit found on the student portal. We can all access it...
karma and credit farming
A lot of people dont download it so you dont get credits and if they get downvotes you loose karma .... no benefit for the person uploading or the people who get spammed with useless crap and miss out on seeing a new summary
Does anyone know of any youtube playlists that can help with this course?
@David Silvertand - you are a lifesaver!
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Do yo think you will be able to upload chapter 20 as well? Thank you so much for the other chapters!
Yes it will be done by the end of this week hopefully ?
:(
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Your summaries look really good! Just wanted to ask whether they synthesised the Notes' contents as well or only the contents from the textbook?
Only the textbook’s for now at least
I know we already had it last tutorial, but of went too fast for me. Can someone explain me the steps to get to the best response curve.
This
You just look for the equilibrium quantities. You start with q of firm 2 until you get q2=..., then you plug q2 in the profit of firm 1 and you look for q1 which will be the BR of q1 and the BR of q2 will then be the response you get if you substitute the q1
I missed last tutorial (friday 15th) due to personal circumstances.. can someone upload the correct answers? thanks in advance!
Someone has the 7th edition of Microeconomics in a pdf file?
Yes I'll upload it
Does anyone else find the tutorial tasks quite confusing and unclear?
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Oh so we don't need to solve them?
You need to solve them but there is no answer which is a numerical value the exercises just show the general models
anyone knows when the key for resit will be up ???
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i think she is not going to put the key at all....
the key is up ! :o
For question 4 on the answer key, it says p>=0.5 but shouldnt it be p<=0.5?
Concerning the last task did you just have to calculate the incentive and participation constraint of the agent? Or were we also supposed to do something with the principals payoff?
Yeah it was just the constraints.
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half the questions are irrelevant for us.
Aren't they all relevant, besides Q1?
3 isnt because we dont do price discrimination. 2c isnt cause we dont do lerner. so only half of 2, 4 and 5
Do we have to write down steps in solving? Or can we just show we plug f.e. q1 in and give the answer?
For sample exam 2 question 1, how do you get to the profit function of (a-MC)square/9, I understand the profit formula and the formulas you have to substitute into it, but I keep getting different answers (And I have the same problem for deriving q*1 and profit 1 and 2 in question 2, the Stackelberg question)
Profit 1 = Profit 2 = (a-q1-q2)q1 - cq1 = aq1 -q1^2 - q1q2 - cq1 = a(a-c/3) - (a-c/3)^2 - (a-c/3)^2 -c(a-c/3) = (a-c)*(a-c/3) - 2 (a-c/3)^2 = (a-c)^2/3 - 2* (a-c)^2/9 = (a-c)^2/9
For sample exam 2, Q1 and Q2 are not relevant correct? We havent covered them this year.. or have we?
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q1 = 0.5a - 0.5q2 - 0.5MC q2 = 0.5a - 0.5q1 - 0.5MC You can plug in q2 into the equation of q1 (or the other way around) q1 = 0.5a - 0.5 (0.5a - 0.5q1 - 0.5MC) - 0.5MC q1 = 0.5a - 0.25a + 0.25q1 + 0.25MC - 0.5MC q1 = 0.25a + 0.25q1 - 0.25MC 0.75q1 = 0.25a - 0.25MC --> You multiply by 4 and divide by 3 to get rid of the 0.75 on the left side q1 = (a - MC) / 3 = q2
For that same question, how do you get to the profit function of (a-MC)square/9, I understand the profit formula and the formulas you have to substitute into it, but I keep getting different answers (And I have the same problem for deriving q*1 and profit 1 and 2 in the Stackelberg question)
Somebody the tutorial 9 answers of part 4?
Are the articles/papers posted on the student portal exam relevant?
What do you think...
They are not
Could you please explain how to come up with the equations?
3+2n: 3 is the payoff you get from cooperating so you get three in that period and then because the trigger strategy says that we would play D in the last n rounds, we take the payoff from d and multiply it by n same procedure for the second one 7 is the payoff you get if you cheat in one period, however after the ts sais that you will be punished and only receive 1 for every following period so 1*n
Hi ! Could someone put all the solutions of the tutorials ? Please !! ;-)
Jonathan Schuler did do that
The real tutor answers are also available. often > Jonathans version
I'm looking for more inspiration on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard :) Do you have any (creative) examples for these two economic situations?
Adverse selection: Insurance company cannot differentiate between heathy and unhealthy people. The insurance company can only offer the average price for both types to both types. Unhealthy people want to buy this insurance, healthy not because it is too expensive. Healthy people are driven out of the market. Moral hazard: A healthy person gets a good & cheap insurance, he does not participate in any dangerous activities. Shortly after he gets his insurance he starts to smoke, do extreme sports and change is lifestyle to an unhealthy one, but he still pays only the healthy persons insurance fees. Short: Adverse selection; bad things before the contract. Moral hazard: Bad things after the contract.
Wow!!! Great!!! Thank youvery much!
In the managerial economics exambook there is the resit 2038B for question 5 there is no correction how would you do with the probabilities to find the BNE?
how do we solve the question from sample exam 3: Consider the following situation. Two companies face the inverse demand function p = 2a - Q where Q is the total demand for both firms on the market. The marginal costs are fixed at c < 2a for either firm. Firms 1 and 2 decide how much to produce without knowing the competitor’s quantity. Firm 1 and 2’s quantities are denoted by q1 and q2, respectively. Either firm’s objective is to maximize the own profit. Assume that a = 20,000 and c = 5. I. What are their equilibrium profits? 1) P1 = 44.4mio and P2 = 44.4mio 2) P1 = 52.7mio and P2 = 52.7mio 3) P1 = 177.8mio and P2 = 177.8mio 4) P1 = 50.7mio and P2 = 113.4mio
If the answer is 3, then we do it as follows: We multiply P * Q to get revenue, take the derivative from that and making it equal to mc. This is q(1)=(2a - q(2)-mc)/2; q(2) equals q(2)=(2a - q(1)-mc)/2 in a similar fashion. Now we substitute q(1) into q(2)(or other way around) and find that q(1) =(2a - MC)/3; when putting all the values in, tap tap tap on your calculator and you get q(1)=13331 we put that into the original p=2a - q(1) - q(2) and get that P = 13 338, the cost per a product is 5, thus profit per a product is 13 333 and the total profit= 13 333* 13 331 = 177.8mio. As the MC(1)=MC(2) we can say that firm 2 also makes the same profit.
We know from our tutorials that Cournot Profit is always (a-c)^2/9 with an inverse demand function of p=a-q. (Course coordinator said its ok to know profits by heart, we don´t have to derive them every single time) In this case, the inverse demand function is p=2a-Q, so profit becomes (2a-c)^2/9. Once you know that, you just plug in the numbers and get the correct answer.
52/3 = 17.33
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Its the wrong formula that is given here, if you use the normal variance formula you get to 13 --> Var=p*(x-E(x))^2 adding for every payoff... :)
the calculation is wrong. The variance is the sum of the differences of the outcome and the expected value of the lottery so not 5 but 4.5
which exercises from the tutorials are about incentive contracts? i don't really get it
incentive constraint ? tutorial 8 , 4 : moral hazard and conditional contracts
How do we calculate the welfare, PS and CS under price discrimination?
don't need it for the exam
The solutions given for the sample exam 4 are not that detailed; did anyone solve the questions and is willing to post it?
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How is the payoff equation for v=1 constructed? 12* [1+b-1] + 12*0 = b/2
Since you now only adress half of the market. (someone who values their car for 3 won't sell it to you for 1) you have a 50% chance of getting nothing (meeting a good car which doesn't want to sell you) and a 50% of getting a lemon. This means 50* [Value of the car(1) + extra value only for you, because you think it is worth more (b) -price you pay (-1). If you still don't get it you can think of that you can only search for one car. You need that car to travel to an important apointment. You do not have time to search 2x for a car
Hey, For the sample question 6 for question 2 a) how do they find Pm=8?? and then in b) discount factor 1/2?
Hey Stephanie. I have no clue. I hope I could help you with my answer. Greets
Just disregard the S, as jonathan did in his solutions. Other than that, it's just a crap question
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Why do we get the nash equilibrium as bidder 1 jumps and bidder 2 jumps and not (N,J) or (J,N); also how do we actually get the probabilities?
In this case the probabilities were given, but if you want to do it yourself, you have to use mixed strategy as in Rock,paper,scissor, e.g I. -9p+6*(1-p) II. 0p+3*(1-p) and for player 2 it is I. -9 *(x) +8*(1-x) and II. is 0*x+4*(1-x)
Is "team production" relevant for the exam? (It is in the lecture slides)
no
so there will be an exercise about it?
I guess so
For tutorial 8 I have no idea how you go from the first to the second line. Where does the 6/4 come from? Any help would be much appreciated ( refer to photo)