Kann mir zufällig wer einen Trick verraten für Aufgaben im Stile von 1 h) WS 16/17?
Kann die Lösung zwar nachvollziehen, weiß aber nicht so recht wie man auf sowas schnell selber kommt.
Natürlich vergleiche ich die verschiedenen Strategien miteinander, aber wie haben ja 3 Variablen???
Spieler 1 will in der ersten Runde (B,r) und spielt B. Damit Spieler 2 mitmacht und r spielt, droht Spieler 1 ihm in der zweiten Runde T zu spielen, falls Spieler 2 in der ersten Runde nicht r spielt. Wenn in der ersten Runde (B,r) gespielt wurde, sollte in der zweiten Runde dann (M,m) gespielt werden. Also ist das GG wenn es sich für Spieler 2 mehr lohnt zu kooperieren als abzuweichen.
So verstehe ich das jedenfalls ;)
Can anybody explain 6.2 c)?
There is one thing I dont understand. If the monopolist can force the competitor to leave the game, it is said that he earns the payoff x in the remaining periods. And x>z>y. So why does the solution suggest that his strategie is (N,F,N)? Couldn´t he be better off by just fighting in the first period and then receive the highest payoff x throughout the remainder of the game? I mean the competitor can not reenter the game..
Can anybody help me? Thanks in advance! (Antwort kann auch gerne auf deutsch sein)
well as far as I understand it that is exactly what happens. Even when we start in the third period, we continue the backwards induction til period 1. If you sum up now all of his payoffs you'll get z+discont x + discont suqare x (first period he can't kick him out, so he chooses N and gets z, the other periods he'll get x
be sure to remind that y+dx > (1+d)z
1 week ago
Anybody knows which are the 4 cases that have to be proven in the Perfect Tit-For-Tat?
mixed strategies represent the probability a player has to choose his strategies with so that the other player is indifferent (gets the same payoff) )when choosing his strategies.
player 1 will choose strategy A with prob p1, B with prob p2 and C with prob 1-p1-p2
player 2 will choose strategy A with prob q1, B with prob q2 and C with prob 1-q1-q2
That means that the expected payoff of player 1 when choosing A depends in the probability that player 2 selects A,B,C.
For E1(A)=q1*U1(A,A)+q2*U1(A,B)+(1-q1-q2)*U1(A,C) = q1*0+q2*v1+(1-q1-q2)*v1
The same is done for E1(B) and E1(C).
After that is found that is what player 1 can expect to win when choosing each strategy,
Now, player 2 wants to make player 1 indifferent between choosing A,B,C meaning that he wants player 1 to valuate the payoffs from chossing A,B or C equally. to do that we simpley need to solve the following system of equations
E1(A) = E1(B)
E1(C) = E1(B)
We solve for q1 and q2. Then just d 1-q1-q2 to determine the other probability. This gives us the probability with which player 2 needs to play each startegy so that player 1 is indifferent.
After that, the same needs to be done for player 2.
Then for each of those final 6 equations q1, q2, 1-q1-q2, p1 p2, 1-p1-p2 take the limit when v3 goes to 0 and explain the result
1 week ago
Hi guys, does anybody have the solution for Klausur Spieltheorie (WS 2015/2016)? Thanks